Tying loose ends

Minor update at the end.


While writing the post on partition, I forgot to include some relevant info which I am including in this post.
But first I will like to summarize the post, as I think it is very much likely that the length of the post might have obscured the theme, which is the conventional view of moderate Muslims as Pro-India and fundamentalist Muslims as pro-Partition is not necessarily borne out by the historical facts.

One such inconvenient fact is the role, respectively of Barelvis and Deobandis with respect to partition. Deobandis are usually considered to be orthodox Islamic school with emphasis on Islamic jurisprudence such as   Shariah and Hadith. In contrast Barelvis are considered relatively unorthodox with a significant incorporation of Islamic experience in India, specifically Sufi traditions. Historically Deobandis have been considered more of conservative/traditionalist and Barelvis reformist/modernists. Yet their role during partition were diametrically opposite to what conventional view would dictate, while Deobandis sided with Congress and opposed partition, Barelvis were in general agreement with Muslim League *

Then there is something I want to address. Rohit, in one of our conversations, remarked that my hypothesis can not explain the fact why Muslims in such a large number chose to stay behind in India. Actually I think one need not even my hypothesis to explain the fact.

Simply put, for League leaders demand for Pakistan was just a bargaining chip to extract maximum concession from Congress. They had hoped, that by raising by communal passion for Pakistan, they could corner Congress leaders into conceding their demands for an ill conceived arrangement superficially resembling federalism. This gambit backfired, and Muslim League ended up with what Jinnah termed as a moth eaten Pakistan. For most of the League leaders Pakistan should have included Hyderabad, Lucknow and Delhi, traditional centers of Indo-Islamic culture and power. However for most of the Muslims residing in what is currently Republic of India, leaving their home for Pakistan was never a real option.

That said, it should be noted making sense of Identity is always perplexing with different intrepreations according to different vantage points. Specifically and reiterating what I wrote in the previous posts, different individuals have diverse influences on the identity. A plebeian unless he is in sync with others of same class has minimal effect on identity, whereas a social elite, either because of his wealth or because of his intellect,  has disproportionately larger influence over the identity. Why is that? Maslow's hierarchy of needs is the answer.

For elites not concerned with fulfillment of basic are naturally more inclined towards identity. Which is why "common man doesn't care about X", although superficially appealing is nonsensical as far as human psychology is concerned.

"But wait", Some might say, "If common man is not concerned with identity, then your point doesn't stand". This is a misreading of what I am trying to convey. Common man doesn't influence the identity to a great extent, but he is influenced by the identity which he shares with the elite.

This is what happened in case of Partition. For a common Muslim, identity was not a major issue, but for an elite a united India meant sub-ordination of Islamic identity to Hindu identity which was a reversal from history where Islamic identity ruled over Hindu identity and thus a matter of distress and insecurity.

This is why the movement for Partition started not in Muslim majority provinces but Gangetic Plains including Bengal, over which Muslims, even though in minority, had ruled for so many centuries.

Initially Muslim League had limited success with masses, even though Khilafat movement was preparing ground for eventual communal polarization. One dirty secret of Congress, in order to undercut Jinnah who was Shia, it actively fueled Sunni-Shia sectarian conflict, foreshadowing Sikh terrorism. Also it is interesting to note that Maulana Azad was much more orthodox in his religious outlook than Jinnah. This explains the drubbing Muslim League received in 1937. However within a decade the situation was reversed, much of it due to the Ulema. 

After this, only the matter of Mahatma Gandhi's politics remains, which I will touch in another post.

Update: In fact I am confident that this hypothesis can be applied to global Islamic terrorism as well.